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INTRODUCTION 
Physician-assisted suicide.  An oxymoron.  The concept goes against the grain.  It 
runs counter to thousands of years of understanding of the physician’s role, 
embodied in the timeless credo:  “Do no harm.”2  It runs counter to themes that 
                                                                
1J.D. 1999, Temple University School of Law; M.D. 1983, University of Rochester School 
of Medicine; B.A. 1979, Yale University.  My thanks to Professor Laura E. Little for her 
advice and comments on this Article. 
2Although not actually included in the Hippocratic Oath, “the promise to do no harm, 
Primum Non Nocere, is irrevocably bound to the Hippocratic principle of the sanctity of 
human life.”  C. Everett Koop, Introduction, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996). 
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pervade western philosophy and literature.  As Alexander Pope said in 1733: “Hope 
springs eternal in the human breast.”3  Somewhat more recently, Yogi Berra 
expressed the same sentiment in equally timeless fashion with the remark:  “It ain’t 
over til it’s over.”4 
Yet, as medicine and technology continue to advance, public debate increasingly 
focuses on whether in some hopeless situations, there comes a time to acknowledge 
that “it’s over.”5  Between eighteen to thirty percent of physicians report that they 
have received requests from patients for help in dying.6  Thirty-six percent of 
physicians indicate that they would assist terminally ill suffering patients in ending 
their lives were it legal to render such aid.7 
Currently, Oregon stands alone in allowing patient and physician to openly carry 
out such end-of-life decisions.  The Oregon Death with Dignity Act (DWDA),8 
passed by voter referendum in 1994 and re-approved in 1997, is the only American 
law that authorizes a physician to aid a terminally ill, competent patient in 
committing suicide.9  A similar referendum was defeated by Michigan voters in 
November 1999.10  At the national level, Congress is considering legislation to bar 
physicians from prescribing medication for the purpose of hastening a patient’s 
demise.11 
While physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is thus being debated in the legislature 
and in the polling booth, it is also being debated in the courtroom.  Laws legalizing 
PAS and those prohibiting it have been the subject of disputes.  Courts have 
therefore considered the rights at issue from opposite vantage points.  For example, 
in Lee v. Oregon,12 a challenge to the DWDA that ultimately failed because the 
plaintiffs lacked standing, the question was whether a law allowing PAS infringes 
the constitutional rights of vulnerable individuals who might need protection from 
having assisted suicide imposed on them.13  However, in Washington v. Glucksberg 
and Vacco v. Quill, the question was whether laws prohibiting assisted suicide 
                                                                
3ALEXANDER POPE, An Essay on Man, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF POPE 139 
(Henry W. Boynton ed., 1903). 
4YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK 121 (1998). 
5Id. 
6Diane E. Meier, M.D. et al., A National Survey of Physician-Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia in the United States, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1193, 1195 (1998). 
7Id. 
8OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.897 (1997). 
9Patrick M. Dunn, The Oregon Experience, 6 ANNALS LONG-TERM CARE 333, 333 (1998).  
10Charlie Cain & Tim Kiska, Voters Overwhelmingly Reject Assisted Suicide, DETROIT 
NEWS (Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.detnews.com/1998/election/9811/04/11040198.htm>; Gary 
Henlein, Assisted Suicide Finally Before Voters: It’s Just 1 Proposal of a Trio the People Get 
to Decide Nov. 3, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 31, 1998, at D1. 
11Sarah Kellogg, Congress Set to Tackle Assisted Suicide Bill, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Sept. 
16, 1998, at A1. 
12Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1387-90 (9th Cir. 1997). 
13Id. at 1386. 
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violate the constitutional rights of terminally ill individuals seeking assistance in 
ending their lives.14 
This Article examines several aspects of the medical and legal debate on 
physician-assisted suicide.  Part I describes the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, the 
only existing American law legalizing physician assisted suicide.  Understanding the 
provisions of the DWDA provides a concrete, practical framework for discussing the 
medical and constitutional issues central to the PAS debate. 
Part II considers the wisdom of the DWDA in light of current medical knowledge 
and practice.  The law allows a patient, with only a few months to live, a humane end 
to intolerable suffering under controlled conditions.  It is carefully crafted to ensure 
that patient and physician deliberate about the decision over at least a fifteen-day 
period, thereby discouraging impulsive behavior.  It renders unnecessary the 
occasional practice of using high doses of sedating medications putatively for 
palliative purposes, but with the covert, inadequately discussed purpose of hastening 
the patient’s death.15  However, the DWDA does not sufficiently account for the 
complex motivations of patients requesting suicide.  In addition, the statute does not 
fully consider the subtleties involved in differentiating clinical depression from 
expected sadness in terminally ill patients.  In order to address these problems, the 
Oregon legislature should amend the DWDA to mandate that a psychiatrist must 
evaluate every patient who requests assistance to end his life. 
Part III of this Article examines whether the DWDA passes constitutional muster 
in light of the Supreme Court’s recent landmark decisions in Glucksberg and Vacco.  
Consistent with its prevailing federalism jurisprudence,16 the Court refrained from 
finding new fundamental liberty interests17 in order to allow the state legislatures to 
determine policy on assisted suicide.  The same approach in a due process or equal 
protection challenge to the DWDA logically would lead the Court to conclude that 
the law does not infringe upon fundamental liberty interests.  The appropriate test of 
DWDA’s constitutionality, therefore, would be the lenient “rational basis” test.18  
DWDA is rationally related to legitimate state interests.  Under this test, the Court 
likely would uphold the Oregon statute. 
To complete the analysis, Part III also considers how the DWDA would fare in 
the less likely event that the Court finds that a challenge to the law implicates 
fundamental liberty interests.  In this case, the statute would be scrutinized more 
searchingly, and its survival would be less certain. 
                                                                
14Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 708-09 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 
796-97 (1997). 
15This doctrine, known as “double intent,” is explained further in notes 92-97 and 
accompanying text. 
16See infra note 142 for a discussion of “federalism jurisprudence.” 
17See infra note 106 for discussion of the distinction between “fundamental rights” and 
“fundamental liberty interests.” 
18See infra notes 136-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Court’s 
restrained approach to finding new fundamental liberty interests would lead it to apply the 
rational basis test to the DWDA. 
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II.  THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 
The DWDA consists of six sections: General Provisions; Written Request for 
Medication to End One’s Life in a Humane and Dignified Manner; Safeguards; 
Immunities and Liabilities; Severability; and Form of the Request.19 
The General Provisions section consists of key definitions of words and phrases 
used in the Act.20  Most importantly, the definition of “terminal disease” limits the 
availability of assisted suicide to a narrow group of patients—those with medically 
confirmed incurable, irreversible disease and a prognosis of less than six months to 
live.21 
The first section also defines an “incapable” patient as one who “lacks the ability 
to make and communicate health care decisions to health care providers.”22  Only an 
adult, Oregon resident able to make and communicate these decisions, and therefore 
deemed “capable” may request medication according to Section 2.23  The patient 
must have a terminal disease as defined by Section 1; and this condition must have 
been diagnosed by an attending physician and confirmed by another physician.24  
Both physicians must agree that the patient is capable and has made the request 
voluntarily.25 
Two witnesses must also attest to the capability of the patient and the voluntary 
nature of the request.26  Recognizing the pressures that terminal patients face, the 
statute requires that at least one witness must not be a family member, a person with 
an interest in the patient’s estate, or a person connected with the health care facility 
where the patient is receiving treatment.27  Moreover, the patient’s attending 
physician may not be a witness.28 
The “Safeguards” section outlines the responsibilities of the attending and 
consulting physicians.29  Either physician must refer the patient for “counseling” if 
the doctor believes the patient is “suffering from a psychiatric or psychological 
disorder, or depression causing impaired judgment.”30  Thus, not every patient is 
referred for counseling.  Upon referral, a state licensed psychiatrist or psychologist 
counsels the patient.31  This mental health professional must determine that the 
                                                                
19OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.897 (1997). 









29§§ 127.815, 127.820. 
30§ 127.825. 
31§ 127.800. 
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patient is free from mental illness causing impaired judgment before the patient 
receives medication for the purpose of suicide.32  
In order to minimize impulsive behavior, the DWDA specifies that a patient must 
make three requests, two oral and one written.33  There must be a waiting period of at 
least fifteen days between the two oral requests.34  After the written request, there is a 
forty-eight hour waiting period before a prescription may be written.35  Immediately 
before writing the prescription, the physician must verify that the patient is making 
an informed decision.36  That is, the patient must appreciate the relevant facts and the 
doctor must inform the patient of his diagnosis, prognosis, and the risks and probable 
result of taking the medication.37  The patient also must be informed that he may 
rescind his request at any time.38 
Section 4 immunizes health care providers from liability if they have complied 
with the DWDA in good faith.39  However, coercing or exerting undue influence on a 
patient to request medication for the purpose of suicide is defined as a Class A 
felony.40 
The sample form of the request requires only that the patient write his name and 
diagnosis in the appropriate blanks, initial next to the decision made by the patient 
about whether to inform family, and sign at the bottom of the form.41  The form 
indicates that the patient understands his diagnosis, prognosis, and the nature of his 
request.42  It also indicates that he understands that the outcome of the request will be 
to end his life “in a humane and dignified manner.”43  This is reiterated later with the 
words:  “I expect to die when I take the medication to be prescribed.”44   
III.  THE DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT IN LIGHT OF MEDICAL  
KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE 
Physicians are trained to view suicidal ideation as a symptom of depression.45  
Indeed, to many psychiatrists, their job in treating suicidal patients is to help patients 














45In the authoritative manual of psychiatric diagnosis, suicidal ideation is a cardinal 
symptom of a “Major Depressive Episode.” DSM-IV DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 327 (4th ed.,1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].  The other major symptoms 
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make adjustments so that suicide no longer seems necessary.46  Yet the DWDA 
contradicts these notions by reflecting the belief that some terminally ill patients who 
are not mentally ill may nevertheless wish to die.47  
The Act excludes patients “suffering from a psychiatric or psychological 
disorder, or depression causing impaired judgment” from participating in PAS.48  
This construction is ambiguous.  Did the authors of the DWDA intend to exclude all 
patients with any psychiatric or psychological disorders, or did they mean to prevent 
access to PAS by only the subset of patients with disorders causing impaired 
judgment?49  Had the authors intended to exclude all mentally ill patients with or 
without impaired judgment, the additional clause excluding patients with “depression 
causing impaired judgment” would be redundant.  Moreover, studies support 
allowing patients with psychiatric conditions that do not impact on their decision-
making processes, such as mild to moderate depression, to participate in PAS.50  
Excluding only patients with conditions that impair judgment, therefore, is medically 
sound in light of this research.  
By specifically prohibiting patients with “depression causing impaired judgment” 
from participating,51 the DWDA reflects the understanding that depression is by far 
the most common psychiatric disorder affecting patients with suicidal thoughts.52  
This clause also  implicitly accepts that while some depressed patients have impaired 
judgment, in other depressed patients judgment remains intact.  Therefore, depressed 
                                                          
are: depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day; markedly diminished interest in usual 
activities; significant weight loss; sleep disturbance; agitation or lethargy that is observable by 
others; loss of energy; feelings of worthlessness or guilt; and diminished ability to concentrate.  
Id.  A patient must have at least five of these symptoms during the same two-week period for a 
physician to diagnose a Major Depressive Episode.  Id. 
46Yeates Conwell & Eric D. Caine, Rational Suicide and the Right to Die, 325 NEW ENG. 




“Judgment may be defined as the mental activity of comparing or evaluating alternatives 
within the framework of a given set of values for the purpose of deciding on a course of 
action.”  Martin B. Keller & Theo C. Manschreck, The Biologic Mental Status Examination II: 
Higher Intellectual Functioning, in OUTPATIENT PSYCHIATRY DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 203, 
209 (Aaron Lazare ed., 1979).  Evaluation of judgment is a standard part of the mental status 
evaluation, and judgment is often impaired by significant mental illness.  Id. 
50See Mark D. Sullivan & Stuart J. Youngner, Depression, Competence, and the Right to 
Refuse Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 971, 974-77 (1994) (citing 
studies showing that the impact of mild to moderate depression on preferences concerning 
life-sustaining treatment in the elderly is limited, and arguing that the presence of psychiatric 
illness does not necessarily render a patient incompetent to make a decision about dying).  See 
also Linda Ganzini et al., The Effect of Depression Treatment on Elderly Patients’ Preferences 
for Life-Sustaining Medical Therapy, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1631, 1634-35 (1994) (finding 
that remission of mild to moderate depression did not result in an increase in the desire for 
life-sustaining medical treatment in elderly patients). 
51§ 127.825. 
52See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the prevalence of 
depression in suicidal patients. 
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patients with intact judgment could be candidates for PAS.  An alternative, albeit less 
likely, interpretation of this clause is that the DWDA considers all individuals with 
depression to have impaired judgment.  Under this interpretation, if an individual’s 
judgment is not impaired he could not be diagnosed as depressed, but rather, merely 
as experiencing sadness as part of the adjustment process.  Such an interpretation, 
however, would be inconsistent with current psychiatric diagnostic classifications, 
which do not specifically require impaired judgment to diagnose a depressive 
disorder.53  Regardless of which interpretation is correct, the DWDA appears to 
acknowledge the difference between sadness that often accompanies terminal illness, 
and clinical depression with impaired judgment that requires treatment.54   
A.  Distinguishing Depression from Sadness 
Controversy exists, however, about whether physicians can distinguish sadness 
from clinical depression in terminally ill patients who are suicidal.  In one study of 
200 terminally ill patients, 17 (8.5%) acknowledged a pervasive desire to die.55  Of 
these 17 potential candidates for PAS, researchers diagnosed 10 patients (58.8%) 
with depressive syndromes.56  Thus, 7 patients (42.2%) who wished to end their lives 
were not suffering from “clinical” depression,57 and might be appropriate for PAS. 
Other studies, however, suggest that nearly all suicidal patients suffer from 
psychiatric disorders.  In a study cohort of 44 terminally ill patients, 10 subjects 
expressed suicidal ideation.58  Researchers diagnosed all 10 suicidal patients as 
severely depressed.59  A British study retrospectively reviewed 100 suicides.60  A 
panel of three psychiatrists reviewing information about these suicides diagnosed 93 
of the 100 patients as mentally ill, and 70 patients as depressed.61  Some authors have 
extrapolated from the high percentage of mental illness in patients who commit 
suicide to suggest that the percentage of mental illness would be similar in patients 
requesting PAS.62  This reasoning overlooks the possibility that two populations of 
                                                                
53See supra note 45 for the diagnostic criteria for a Major Depressive Episode. 
54DSM-IV differentiates periods of sadness that “are inherent aspects of the human 
experience” from a Major Depressive Episode.  DSM-IV, supra note 45, at 326.  
55Harvey Max Chochinov et al., Desire for Death in the Terminally Ill, 152 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1185, 1187 (1995). 
56Id. 
57Id. 
58James Henderson Brown et al., Is It Normal for Terminally Ill Patients to Desire Death?, 
143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 208, 210 (1986). 
59Id. 
60B. Barraclough et al., A Hundred Cases of Suicide: Clinical Aspects, 125 BR. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 355, 356 (1974). 
61Id. at 356, 358. 
62See Herbert Hendin & Gerald Klerman, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Dangers of 
Legalization, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 143, 143 (1992) (citing studies indicating that 95% of 
those who commit suicide have a diagnosable psychiatric illness as a reason to be wary of 
legalizing PAS).  But see Linda Ganzini et al., Attitudes of Patients with Amyotrophic Lateral 
Sclerosis and Their Care Givers Toward Assisted Suicide, 339 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 967, 969-70 
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patients differ significantly.  A patient who wishes to go through a carefully 
regulated process of consultations in order to legally end his life may be quite 
different from a patient who unilaterally decides to commit suicide despite legal and 
societal proscriptions.  Moreover, in the British study the patients were a randomly 
selected sample of patients who committed suicide for any reason.63  The authors did 
not mention if any of the study patients were terminally ill.64 
Current diagnostic criteria for depression further complicate difficulties in 
distinguishing depression from sadness in terminal suicidal patients.  The fact that 
suicidal thinking is one of the cardinal criteria for depression confounds efforts to 
determine the relationship of suicidal thoughts to depression.65  Other symptoms of 
depression such as weight loss, decreased appetite, fatigue, insomnia, and loss of 
energy are also common symptoms of terminal medical illness.66  Despite these 
caveats, a 1997 study concluded that the distinction could be made very simply.67  
The authors found that by merely asking a patient: “Are you depressed?” they were 
able to identify every patient diagnosed with a depressive disorder using more 
complicated screening tools.68  Other researchers suggest that the distinction between 
sadness and clinical depression may be more subtle,69 primary care physicians may 
not be adequately skilled to recognize the difference,70 and more research and 
standards are needed to guide physicians evaluating depression in the terminally ill.71 
B.  Assessing the Meaning of the Request for Suicide: The Need for Mandatory 
Psychiatric Evaluation 
The question of whether a terminal patient may wish to commit suicide but not 
be clinically depressed is part of the larger debate about whether a patient’s request 
for assistance in committing suicide can ever be rational.  Physicians who work with 
                                                          
(1998).  The authors found that while 56 of 100 patients with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis 
said they would consider assisted suicide, only 11 of these 100 patients had a major depressive 
disorder. Id.  Moreover, there was no difference in the prevalence of depression between those 
patients who would consider assisted suicide and those who would not.  Id. at 969. 
63Barraclough, supra note 60, at 355. 
64Id. at 356, 358. 
65Brown, supra note 58, at 208. 
66Id. at 208-09. 
67Harvey Max Chochinov et al., “Are You Depressed?”  Screening for Depression in the 
Terminally Ill, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 674, 675 (1997). 
68Id. 
69Conwell, supra note 46, at 1101; see also Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Physician-Assisted 
Suicide in Oregon: A Bold Experiment, 274 JAMA 483, 484 (1995) (discussing the difficulties 
in distinguishing sadness from clinical depression). 
70Conwell, supra note 46, at 1101; see also Susan D. Block & J. Andrew Billings, Patient 
Requests for Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in Terminal Illness:  The Role of the 
Psychiatrist, 36 PSYCHOSOMATICS 445, 448 (1995) (suggesting that primary care physicians 
are rarely adequately trained to differentiate sadness from depression). 
71Timothy E. Quill et al., The Debate Over Physician-Assisted Suicide: Empirical Data 
and Convergent Views, 128 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 552, 553 (1998).  
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terminal patients emphasize the importance of carefully exploring the possible 
meanings contained in a request to die.72  A patient may ask to die because of 
intractable pain for which better palliative care might be available if the patient made 
his needs known directly.73  A request for suicide may be an expression of 
unconscious feelings of rage or guilt.74  Or it may be a way of gaining control in a 
situation where the patient feels he has no control over his life.75 
Even a careful exploration of the meanings of a patient’s request to die will not 
yield an easy answer about the appropriateness of the request.  Physicians hold 
extremely strong convictions about PAS based on their fundamental values, 
religious, and philosophical beliefs.76  This can lead the well-meaning physician to 
conclude that a request is rational if she believes that PAS is an acceptable option, or 
irrational if she is opposed to PAS.77  Supporters of PAS emphasize that it is justified 
only in exceptional circumstances, for the small number of patients who will not 
respond to the best palliative care.78  In such situations, the physician needs to decide 
whether the request for PAS is truly in keeping with the patient’s values, and 
whether it is a truly informed, autonomous decision.79  
While the DWDA provides that the attending or consulting physician may refer a 
patient for counseling with a state licensed psychiatrist or psychologist,80 the Oregon 
legislature should amend the statute to mandate that a psychiatrist must evaluate 
every patient who requests assistance to end his life.81  As explained above, this 
change is needed because of concern in the medical community about the difficulty 
in understanding the complex meanings of the patient’s request for suicide, as well 
                                                                
72Philip R. Muskin, The Request to Die: Role for a Psychodynamic Perspective on 
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 279 JAMA 323, 324-26 (1998). 
73Block & Billings, supra note 70, at 447; Muskin, supra note 72, at 325. 
74Muskin, supra note 72, at 324-26. 
75Id. at 324. 
76See Quill, supra note 71, at 556 (advising that physicians should not violate their 
fundamental values in the provision of care to the terminally ill). 
77See Sullivan, supra note 50, at 976-77 (opining that the wide variability in values with 
respect to life and death makes it difficult for a physician to objectively evaluate a patient’s 
request to die). 
78Quill, supra note 71, at 556-57. 
79Id. at 74. 
80§ 127.825. 
81Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Oregon’s Physician-Assisted Suicide Law.  Provisions and 
Problems, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 825, 827-28 (1996).  Compare  Timothy E. Quill et 
al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill:  Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1382 (1992) (recommending psychiatric evaluation when uncertainty 
exists about the patient’s judgment, but stopping short of suggesting such an evaluation should 
be mandatory for all patients considering PAS), with William Breitbart et al., Interest in 
Physician-Assisted Suicide Among Ambulatory HIV-Infected Patients, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
238, 242 (1996) (arguing that the “critical role” of psychiatric intervention in terminal illness 
is highlighted by findings that HIV-infected patients’ interest in PAS is more a function of 
psychological distress than physical factors).  
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as because of the difficulty in distinguishing depression from appropriate sadness.  
Moreover, the psychiatrist should be someone with special expertise in helping 
terminally ill patients make end-of-life decisions.82 
C.  Waiting Period 
The DWDA is specific in addressing the issue of how long a patient must wait 
before a request for medication will be honored.  The physician may not prescribe 
medication until at least fifteen days after the patient’s initial request.83 
The purpose of this waiting period is two-fold: to allow the attending and 
consulting physicians adequate time to evaluate the patient, and to allow the patient 
time to reflect on his decision.  One study raised concerns regarding the likelihood of 
the patient having a change of heart in this time period.84  Six terminal patients who 
expressed persistent wishes to die were re-interviewed two weeks later.85  In four of 
the six situations, the desire to die had significantly lessened.86  While the study 
sample is obviously quite small, the results indicate that the question of the stability 
over time of suicidal ideation in terminal patients needs further investigation.  In 
what percent of suicidal terminally ill patients will the ideation remain unchanged 
after one month?  On the other hand, when a patient only has six months to live and 
is suffering throughout that time, how long is it fair to make the patient wait?  The 
issue is complicated even further when the attending physician orders counseling 
before approving a patient’s request for assisted suicide.  The statute gives no 
guidelines about whether the mental health professional should treat the patient for a 
minimum time period before he may “clear” the patient for assisted suicide.  
Ultimately, physicians must rely on their medical judgment to answer these 
questions.  An attending physician who knows her patient well, having treated the 
patient through the course of the illness, will be able to make better decisions about 
the transience or impulsiveness of the request than a physician seeing the patient for 
the first time.87  For this reason, critic Ezekiel Emanuel denigrates the Oregon law 
                                                                
82The Dutch government has recently established, on a trial basis, a special team of 
doctors with special expertise in euthanasia to provide second opinions for primary care 
physicians in cases of possible euthanasia.  Minister Borst: Landelijk Network Euthanasie-
artsen [Minister Borst: Nationwide Network of Enthanasia Doctors], NIEUWSSERVICE VAN 
RADIO NEDERLAND WERELDOMROEP [RADIO NETHERLANDS NEWS SERVICE] (Oct. 26, 1998) 
<http://www.rnw.nl/>.  This pilot program has been enthusiastically received by doctors in 
Amsterdam, and the Minister of Health now supports establishing a nation-wide network of 
euthanasia consultants.  Id.  The need for such a program in a country with years of experience 
with PAS and euthanasia highlights the importance of having doctors expert in end-of-life 
decision-making involved in the process.  
83§ 127.850. 
84Chochinov, supra note 55, at 1189. 
85Id. 
86Id. 
87See James P. Farrell, Letter to the Editor, Deciding Life and Death in the Courtroom: 
Debate and Clarification, 279 JAMA 1259, 1259 (1998) (highlighting the importance of an 
ongoing relationship with a trusted family physician in reaching the best end-of-life 
decisions).  
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for not requiring that the patient make the request for PAS to her own personal 
physician.88  Such a requirement, however, would broach complex questions about 
how to define an acceptable patient-physician relationship.  For example, how many 
patient visits would be required before a doctor becomes the patient’s “personal 
physician?”  In addition, the DWDA would then also need to include special rules to 
handle the situation of a patient referred by a doctor who is morally opposed to PAS 
to one willing to participate in the process. 
Emanuel raises the specter of doctors advertising their willingness to perform 
PAS, thus attracting patients whose requests were denied on careful consideration by 
their own physicians.89  These fears exaggerate the danger of Oregon becoming an 
assisted suicide “mill.”  As of January, 1999, only fifteen to twenty terminally ill 
Oregonians have ended their lives under the provisions of the law.90  Supporters of 
the DWDA argue that the small number of assisted suicides in the fourteen months 
since the law took effect proves that its safeguards are sufficient to prevent abuse.91  
D.  Clear Intent vs. “Double Intent” 
According to Timothy Quill, M.D., physicians and patients sometimes engage in 
mutual deception and unclear decision making in end-of-life decisions because of the 
illegality of PAS.92  Dr. Quill points out that “double effect” laws are used as a 
substitute for PAS.93 Under the doctrine of “double effect” or “double intent,” a 
physician may give a terminally ill suffering patient high doses of sedating 
medication for the purpose of palliation – knowing that an “unintended” result may 
be to hasten the patient’s death.94  Quill argues, persuasively, that legalizing PAS 
allows patient and doctor to have open, in-depth discussions about what is happening 
to the patient, how the patient is experiencing the process of dying, and what options 
are open to him.95  The informed decision that can result from this dialogue is far 
better than the superficial process of prescribing sedating medication ostensibly to 
                                                                
88Ezekiel, supra note 81, at 827. 
89Id.  
90Michael Vitez, Oregon Assisted-Suicide Law Little Used but Well Regarded, 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 19, 1999, at A1. 
91Id. at A1, A6.  Some who opposed the DWDA when it became law now have either 
changed their minds or become more muted in their criticism.  Id. at A6.  For example, John F. 
Tuohey, a Catholic priest in charge of health care ethics for Oregon’s Catholic hospital 
network, acknowledges that the DWDA is “being implemented thoughtfully and carefully.”  
Id.  The head of the Oregon Hospice Association now asserts that the law is “working well.”  
Id. 
92Timothy E. Quill, Letter to the Editor, The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, 332 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1174, 1175 (1995). 
93Id. 
94Timothy E. Quill et al., The Rule of Double Effect – A Critique of its Role in End-of-Life 
Decision Making, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1768, 1768 (1997); see also, Robert Schwartz & 
Katherine Watson, Physician-Assisted Suicide, 6 ANNALS LONG-TERM CARE 71, 72 (1998).  
95Quill, supra note 92, at 1175. 
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help the patient “live better,” even though death is the result.96  Indeed, the openness 
fostered by PAS statutes such as Oregon’s DWDA should actually protect 
“vulnerable” patients from outcomes they truly may not desire.  This contrasts 
sharply with the typical characterizations of the Oregon law as posing risks for 
vulnerable individuals.97 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT  
The United States Supreme Court has not yet decided a case challenging a law 
legalizing physician assisted suicide, such as the DWDA.  Proponents of PAS have 
argued that by recognizing that a patient has a right to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,98 the Court also 
essentially recognized the “right to die with dignity” that is the crux of the issue in 
PAS.99   However, in Washington v. Glucksberg100  and Vacco v. Quill,101 the Court 
recently upheld laws banning assisted suicide. In so doing, the Court distinguished 
the “constitutionally protected” right to refuse life-sustaining treatment recognized in 
Cruzan102 from a right to assisted suicide, which the Court declined to 
countenance.103 This result does not necessarily mean that the Court would strike 
down the DWDA. The challenges in Glucksberg and Vacco to statutes criminalizing 
assisted suicide failed because the statutes did not violate constitutionally protected 
rights of the challengers.104  The statutes were therefore evaluated according to the 
lenient rational basis level of review, and the Court found that they met this 
standard.105  Similarly, the success of a challenge to the Oregon law would depend on 
whether the Court finds that the law violates fundamental rights or liberty interests of 
plaintiffs desiring protection from assisted suicide. How the Court frames the rights 
at issue will determine whether the DWDA is reviewed under the rational basis 
standard, under the more exacting “strict scrutiny” test, or under an intermediate 
                                                                
96Id. 
97Ezekiel, supra note 81; see also Peter M. McGough, Medical Concerns About 
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 521, 527-28 (1995) (arguing based on data 
from the Netherlands that safeguards in the Oregon statute may prove ineffective to protect 
vulnerable individuals).  But see Vitez, supra note 90, at A6 (arguing that greater openness in 
Oregon regarding end-of-life decisions has resulted in an improvement in palliative care for 
terminal patients).   
98497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
99William J. Tarnow, Recognizing a Fundamental Liberty Interest Protecting the Right to 
Die: An Analysis of Statutes Which Criminalize or Legalize Physician-Assisted Suicide, 4 
ELDER L.J. 407, 409 (1996). 
100521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
101521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
102Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722-23. 
103Id. at 728. 
104Id.; Vacco, 521 U.S. at 799. 
105Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728; Vacco, 521 U.S. at 799-800. 
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level of scrutiny.106  Much can be divined about how the Court will frame the rights 
in question from the Court’s decisions in Glucksberg and Vacco. 
A.  Implications of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health for the Death 
With Dignity Act 
A young, non-terminally ill patient was at the center of the controversy in the 
first “right to die” case considered by the Supreme Court.107  At the age of 25, Nancy 
Beth Cruzan was severely injured in an automobile accident and left in a persistent 
vegetative state.108  After several years in this condition, her parents sought 
discontinuation of the tube feedings that kept her alive.109  The Missouri trial court 
acceded to the parents’ wishes, but the Missouri Supreme Court reversed this 
decision.110  Missouri’s highest court held that Nancy Cruzan’s prior statements did 
not demonstrate by the required clear and convincing evidence that she preferred 
death to existence in a vegetative state.111 
While the Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri ruling regarding the necessary 
evidence of intent in the case of an incompetent patient,112 the Court did establish a 
right to die for competent individuals under certain circumstances.113  This decision 
sparked a vociferous debate on the precise nature of the established right, a debate 
that continued in the years between Cruzan and Glucksberg.114  
Contrary to what some scholars had predicted, the Cruzan Court did not extend 
the constitutional right of privacy developed in Griswold v. Connecticut115 and Roe v. 
Wade116 to right to die cases.117  In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
                                                                
106See Kathleen McGowan, Physician Assisted Suicide A Constitutional Right?, 37 CATH. 
LAW. 225, 232-33 (1997).  The author points out that recent Supreme Court cases have 
discussed substantive due process rights in terms of a “liberty interest” in addition to using the 
traditional “fundamental right” analysis.  Id.  While a law that impinges on a liberty interest 
must survive  heightened scrutiny, the level of scrutiny may be intermediate, rather than strict.  
Id. 
107Thomas Wm. Mayo, Constitutionalizing the ‘Right to Die,’ 49 MD. L. REV. 103, 104 
(1990). 
108Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266. 
109Id. at 267. 
110Id. at 268.  
111Id. at 268-69.  
112Id. at 283-84. 
113Id. at 286 (finding that a state may “choose to defer” to the wishes of a competent 
patient to end her life if the state’s evidentiary standard for intent is met). 
114See Lawrence O. Gosdin, Deciding Life and Death in the Courtroom From Quinlan to 
Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Vacco–A Brief History and Analysis of Constitutional Protection of 
the ‘Right to Die,’ 278 JAMA 1523, 1523 (1997) (discussing the distinction between the right 
to die and the right to refuse medical treatment, and arguing that subsequent cases have shown 
that Cruzan stands for the latter principle).   
115381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
116410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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formulated the issue not as the right to die, but as the “right to refuse unwanted 
medical treatment.”118  He then explicitly stated that this right does not come under 
the rubric of a “generalized constitutional right of privacy.”119  Rather, the majority 
viewed the right to refuse treatment as a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest 
derived from the common law doctrine of informed consent.120  This doctrine is 
rooted in the more specific right to protect one’s bodily integrity from unwanted 
intrusions.121 
B.  The Glucksberg Court Clarifies Cruzan 
Because Cruzan was a 5-4 decision,122 and because of changes in Court 
membership,123 uncertainty persisted regarding how the Court would apply the 
liberty interest recognized in Cruzan to assisted suicide.  Three of the Cruzan 
dissenters (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) argued for a constitutionally 
protected right to die with dignity.124  The fourth dissenter, Justice Stevens, more 
specifically linked the right to die with the right to privacy: “The failure of 
Missouri’s policy to heed the interests of a dying individual with respect to matters 
so private is ample evidence of the policy’s illegitimacy.”125  
By the time Glucksberg was decided, however, Justice Stevens was the lone 
Cruzan dissenter still on the Court.126  All of the Cruzan majority, by contrast, 
remained, with the exception of Justice White.127  Of the newcomers, only Justice 
Breyer explicitly formulated the right at issue in assisted suicide as the right to die 
with dignity.128  Thus the tenuous Cruzan majority became a solid majority in 
Glucksberg. 
The Glucksberg Court confidently reiterated that Cruzan did not recognize a right 
to die, but, merely a “constitutionally protected right” to refuse medical treatment.129  
                                                          
117Mayo, supra note 107, at 109-10. 
118Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277-78. 
119Id. at 279. 
120Id. at 278.  
121Gosdin, supra note 114, at 1524. 
122Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 263-64. 
123See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of changes in Court 
membership subsequent to Cruzan. 
124Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
125Id. at 351 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
126Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun retired in 1990, 1991, and 1994 respectively.  
GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW app. at B-6 (13th ed. 
1997). 
127Id.  Justice White retired in 1993. 
128Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 790 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
129Id. at 722-23.  Chief Justice Rehnquist used the term “constitutionally protected right” 
to indicate that the right to refuse medical treatment did not rise to the level of a fundamental 
right.  See Paul S. Kawai, Should the Right to Die be Protected? Physician Assisted Suicide 
and Its Potential Effect on Hawaii, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 783, 788, 791-93 (1997).  The author 
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This assumption allowed the Court to find that the right in Cruzan was a completely 
different right, analyzed in a different fashion, than the liberty interests at stake in 
PAS.   
C.  The Facts of Washington v. Glucksberg 
The subject of the controversy in Glucksberg was a Washington statute that made 
assisting a suicide attempt a felony punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment and 
up to a $10,000 fine.130  Three terminally ill patients, four physicians who treat 
terminally ill patients, and a Washington non-profit organization, Compassion in 
Dying, that counsels patients considering assisted suicide challenged the law.131  The 
plaintiffs asserted that the statute violated a fundamental liberty protected by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.132  They defined this fundamental 
liberty interest as the “right to choose a humane, dignified death.”133  
D.  Due Process Implications of Glucksberg for the Death With Dignity Act 
While the Court upheld the Washington law prohibiting assisted suicide,134 this 
does not mean that the Court would strike down a law permitting assisted suicide.  
Through both the overall tone of the majority and concurring opinions, and through 
explicit statements, the six justices who wrote opinions made it clear that the point of 
the Glucksberg decision was to promote debate on assisted suicide, not to end it.135 
For this reason, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the majority opinion, emphasized the 
need to carefully formulate the liberty interest at issue.136  He noted that the Court’s 
traditional reluctance “to expand the concept of substantive due process” stems from 
a realization that finding a particular right or liberty interest deserves constitutional 
protection places “the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative 
                                                          
reviews the Court’s use of a balancing test in Cruzan to weigh the liberty interest of the patient 
against the state’s interests.  Id.  Had the Court viewed the right at issue as a “fundamental” 
right, the Missouri regulation would have been measured according to the strict scrutiny 
standard.  Id. at 791-92. 
130Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707. 
131Id. at 707-08.  
132Id. at 708. 
133Id. at 722.  
134Id. at 705-06. 
135Id.  The discussion that follows describes the pro-debate stances of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Souter.  Justice Ginsburg concurred “substantially for 
the reasons stated by Justice O’Connor.” Id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  Justice Stevens 
would not “foreclose the possibility that an individual plaintiff seeking to hasten her 
death . . .could prevail in a more particularized challenge.”  Id. at 750 (Stevens, J., 
concurring).  Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated his agreement with Justice Stevens on this 
point by quoting him in his majority opinion.  Id. at 735.  Justice Breyer opined that the Court 
might have to revisit its conclusions in these cases “in a situation where there was no 
mechanism for the patient to receive appropriate palliative care.”  Id. at 792 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
136Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722-23. 
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action.”137  Justice O’Connor agreed with this sentiment, opining that the legislature, 
through the “democratic process,” should define the rights of terminally ill patients 
to make end-of-life decisions.138 
Interestingly, Justice Scalia made the same point seven years earlier in his 
concurring opinion in Cruzan.139  He argued that the States and the legislature, not 
the federal courts, should decide whether to honor patients’ end-of-life decisions.140  
Regarding PAS, he elaborated that the States are free to decide that “it is none of the 
State’s business if a person wants to commit suicide.”141  Thus Justice Scalia’s 
federalism jurisprudence approach in Cruzan has become the dominant approach in 
Glucksberg.142 
The Court refused to formulate broadly the right at issue in the challenge to the 
Washington law as the “right to die with dignity.”143  Instead, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist delineated the right narrowly, as the “right to commit suicide which itself 
includes a right to assistance in doing so.”144 
Based on a historical analysis of law and tradition in America, the Court 
concluded that “the asserted ‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a 
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”145  Therefore, the 
Washington law only needed to withstand the rational basis test, rather than strict or 
intermediate level scrutiny, in order to be upheld.146  The Glucksberg Court easily 
found that the law was rationally related to legitimate governmental interests.147 
                                                                
137Id. at 720. 
138Id. at 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  See Katherine C. Glynn, Turning to State 
Legislatures to Legalize Physician-Assisted Suicide for Seriously Ill, Non-Terminal Patients 
After Vacco v. Quill and Washington v. Glucksberg, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 329, 348 (1997) 
(concluding that the Glucksberg Court decided that “if the right to physician-assisted suicide is 
to be established, it must be done by a state legislature and not the Court”). 
139Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
140Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).  
141Id. at 299-300 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
142See Richard E. Coleson, The Glucksberg and Quill Amicus Curiae Briefs: Verbatim 
Arguments Opposing Assisted Suicide, 13 ISSUES L. & MED 3, 45-46.  The author described the 
Court’s “federalism jurisprudence” as embodying respect for state sovereignty and the power 
of the people to govern their own affairs according to the Tenth Amendment.  Id. at 45.  
Coleson argued that the Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit’s expansion of substantive due 
process in Glucksberg because this expansion “strikes at the very heart of this Court’s 
federalism jurisprudence.”  Id. at 46-47. 
143Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722-23. 
144Id. at 723. 
145Id. at 728.  The Court used the term “fundamental liberty interest” rather than 
“fundamental right.”  Id.  Had the Court found a fundamental liberty interest but not a 
fundamental right implicated, the Court might have used intermediate scrutiny to review the 
Washington law.  See supra note 106.  Since neither was implicated, rational basis review is 
all that was necessary.  Id. 
146Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728. 
147Id. at 728-35. 
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The precise definition of the liberty interest at issue thus was a crucial aspect of 
the Glucksberg analysis.  This question would similarly be a crucial part of the 
analysis of a challenge to Oregon’s DWDA.148  Defining the interest at stake in a 
restrained, narrow fashion would be consistent with the tone and specifics of 
Glucksberg.  While the plaintiffs might frame their attack as a claim that the Act 
violates a constitutionally protected “right to live,” the Court probably would reject 
this for the same reasons that it rejected the “right to die” as the liberty interest at 
stake in Glucksberg.  Rather, a formulation more likely not to foreclose public and 
legislative debate would be whether a terminal patient has a fundamental right “to be 
protected from inadequately monitored assisted suicide.” 
Once the Court reached this narrow formulation of the right, it would then need 
to determine whether the right to be protected from inadequately monitored assisted 
suicide is a fundamental right or liberty interest.  If the Court concluded that this 
liberty interest is not fundamental, the Oregon law, like the Washington statute in 
Glucksberg, would then be evaluated under the rational basis test.149  Certainly the 
Glucksberg Court indicated that the DWDA could survive this level of scrutiny.150  
The government has a legitimate interest in protecting terminal patients from great 
pain and unnecessary suffering.151  The DWDA is rationally related to this interest.152 
The Glucksberg Court’s reasons for concluding that the right to assisted suicide 
is not a fundamental liberty interest apply equally well to the analysis of rights 
asserted by those seeking protection from assisted suicide.  As discussed above, the 
Court has indicated that it wants to promote, rather than stifle debate on end-of-life 
decision making.  It has also stated that the legislature, not the courts, should be 
setting policy in this realm.  The Court has acknowledged that refraining from 
expanding the concept of substantive due process by defining new fundamental 
rights serves these interests.  Thus, the Court would not find a fundamental liberty 
interest in the right to be protected from assisted suicide. 
                                                                
148See Jonathan R. Rosenn, The Constitutionality of Statutes Prohibiting and Permitting 
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 875, 898 (1997) (pointing out, prior to the 
Glucksberg decision, that “even if no constitutionally protected right to assisted suicide exists, 
state legislatures may be free to pass laws creating such a right . . . provided the state created 
right does not impinge upon other constitutionally protected interests”). 
149Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (reviewing the requirement that laws intersecting with non-
fundamental liberty interests must pass the rational basis test). 
150Id. at 716 (recognizing that advances in medicine and technology are causing increased 
focus on the need to protect “dignity and independence at the end of life”). 
151Justice O’Connor sees “double intent” laws as legitimately protecting terminal patients 
from great suffering.  Id. at 736-37 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
152See Rosenn, supra note 148, at 882.  Rosenn lists governmental policy considerations 
that provide a rational basis for PAS.  Id.  These are:  “the interest in ending needless pain and 
suffering for those with diseases that offer no chance of recovery;” that government has an 
interest in assisting suicide to prevent patients from attempting to kill themselves on their own 
and potentially failing, causing serious injury that further worsens their quality of life; that 
society has an interest in distributing scarce and costly medical resources to those who want to 
live and to those who have a reasonable chance of recovery. 
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Justice Souter’s concurring opinion highlighted the extent to which the Justices 
are willing to defer to state legislatures’ decisions about PAS.153  On the one hand, 
Justice Souter expressed concerns about protecting vulnerable individuals and about 
avoiding the “slippery slope” to euthanasia.154  However, he asserted:  “How, and 
how far, a State should act in that interest are judgments for the State.”155  Moreover, 
he predicted that, in light of the Glucksberg decision, state legislatures will continue 
to experiment with PAS laws; furthermore, he encouraged such experimentation.156  
Thus Justice Souter clearly subscribes to the federalist approach of supporting the 
prerogative of individual states to make their own laws permitting or prohibiting 
PAS; and, he is unlikely to limit this prerogative by finding a fundamental right or 
liberty interest on either side of the controversy. 
The Glucksberg Court’s treatment of “double intent” laws provides further 
evidence that the Court would uphold the DWDA.157  Washington has a double intent 
law allowing a physician to treat a terminal patient in great pain with sedating 
medication with the understanding that such treatment may also hasten the patient’s 
death.158  Justices O’Connor and Breyer reasoned that the presence of such a law 
mitigated the need to find a fundamental right to assisted suicide.159  Either Justice 
might have dissented if Washington had no double intent law.  Given their approval 
of double intent and concern with the rights of suffering terminal patients, neither 
Justice would be likely to find that the DWDA violates a fundamental right or liberty 
interest. 
Thus far the constitutional analysis of a due process challenge to the Oregon 
statute has assumed that the Court would define the right at issue narrowly and 
would conclude that it is not fundamental.  To complete the due process analysis, we 
must also consider the less likely scenario that the Court might deem protection from 
PAS a fundamental right or liberty interest. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s historical analysis of assisted suicide in western 
democracies provides support for this conclusion.160  The Chief Justice argued that 
western societies have disapproved of, and sometimes criminalized, assisted suicide 
for more than 700 years.161  In the United States, he noted that bans on assisted 
suicide express “the States’ commitment to the protection and preservation of all 
human life.”162  
                                                                
153Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 787-88 (Souter, J., concurring). 
154Id. at 785-87 (Souter, J., concurring). 
155Id. at 787 (Souter, J., concurring). 
156Id. at 788-89 (Souter, J., concurring). 
157Id. at 736-37 (O’Connor, J., concurring), 791 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
158Id. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
159Id. at 736-37 (O’Connor, J., concurring), 791 (Breyer, J., concurring).  See supra notes 
91-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of why double intent is an inadequate substitute 
for PAS.  
160Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710-11. 
161Id. at 711. 
162Id. at 710. 
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If the Court establishes a fundamental right to be protected from PAS, the 
DWDA would then have to survive strict scrutiny in order for it to withstand a 
constitutional challenge.163  A State would need to show that the law is narrowly 
tailored to advance a compelling state interest.164  Given the concerns raised in 
Glucksberg about depressed or incompetent individuals being considered for PAS,165 
the Court might conclude that the DWDA is not narrowly tailored enough to meet 
the strict scrutiny test.  The Glucksberg Court, in references to the Oregon law, 
specifically acknowledged concerns about whether the safeguards in the law are 
sufficient to protect vulnerable individuals.166  Under this analysis, the lack of 
mandatory psychiatric evaluation might prove fatal to the statute. 
If the Court establishes a fundamental liberty interest to be protected from PAS, 
instead of a fundamental right, the Court might subject the DWDA to intermediate 
level scrutiny.167  This test involves balancing the challenger’s interests and the 
state’s interests.168  State interests in preventing suffering of the terminally ill, in 
preventing suffering of patients who fail in private attempts to commit suicide, and 
in allocating scarce medical resources169 outweigh the hypothetical harm postulated 
by those attacking the Oregon statute.170  Thus the DWDA would survive 
intermediate scrutiny.   
E.  The Facts of Vacco v. Quill 
The Glucksberg Court reached its decision to uphold the Washington anti-PAS 
statute through a due process analysis.171  Because the Ninth Circuit did not reach the 
issue of equal protection, the Supreme Court also did not consider this issue.172  The 
Court did consider the equal protection analysis in Vacco v. Quill,173 a case decided 
contemporaneously with Glucksberg.  Moreover, in Lee v. Oregon, the challengers 
claimed that the DWDA violated their equal protection rights.174  While the Ninth 
                                                                
163Kawai, supra note 129 at 791; McGowan, supra note 105. 
164Kawai, supra note 129 at 791. 
165Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 730-31. 
166Id. at 717 (citing Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995), vacated, 107 F.3d 
1382 (9th Cir. 1997), as raising the question of the sufficiency of the safeguards). 
167See McGowan, supra note 106 (discussing the uncertainty regarding whether the Court 
scrutinizes a law impinging on a fundamental “liberty interest” with intermediate level, or 
strict scrutiny). 
168See Kawai, supra note 129, at 791-93. 
169See supra note 152 for further discussion of governmental interests promoted by 
statutes permitting PAS.  
170See Lee, 107 F.3d at 1389 (rejecting the challenge to the Oregon statute because the 
plaintiffs’ assertion of harm was too hypothetical to give them standing). 
171Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710. 
172Id. at 709. 
173521 U.S. at 793. 
174891 F. Supp. at 1431. 
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Circuit rejected this challenge because of the plaintiffs’ lack of standing,175 such a 
challenge could eventually warrant consideration on a substantive basis. 
In Vacco, the plaintiffs challenged a New York law prohibiting PAS as violative 
of equal protection.176  The complaint asserted that the law unfairly distinguished 
between two similarly situated groups: terminally ill patients experiencing great 
suffering who wanted assistance in ending their lives but were denied this assistance, 
and those patients who differed from the first group only by virtue of requiring life-
sustaining treatment to continue living.177  Under New York law, members of the 
second group were allowed to end their lives by refusing or ending life-sustaining 
treatment, but the first group members were required to continue living.178 
F.  Equal Protection Implications of Vacco v. Quill and Lee v. Oregon for the Death 
With Dignity Act 
The Vacco Court first addressed the question of whether this classification 
infringed a fundamental right or involved a suspect classification.179  Finding that the 
distinction did neither of these things, the Court only subjected the law proscribing 
PAS to rational basis level of scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny.180  The Court then 
asserted that “the distinction between assisting suicide and withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment, a distinction widely recognized and endorsed in the medical 
profession and in our legal tradition, is both important and logical; it is certainly 
rational.”181  New York’s reasons for recognizing this distinction were easily viewed 
as serving legitimate ends.182  The Court therefore upheld the New York law.183 
A law legalizing PAS, however, would not distinguish between terminally ill 
patients and terminally ill patients on life-support, because both groups would have 
access to PAS.  The challengers to the DWDA in Lee v. Oregon therefore simply 
raised the issue of whether the statute discriminates between terminally ill and non-
terminally ill individuals.184  The plaintiffs argued that this classification was not 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.185  
The Oregon District Court agreed with the plaintiffs that the DWDA failed the 
rational basis test.186  The court, therefore, was able to invalidate the law without 
considering whether a fundamental liberty interest was implicated in the equal 
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176Vacco, 521 U.S. at 797-98. 
177Id. at 798. 
178Id. 
179Id. at 799. 
180Id. at 799-800. 
181Id. at 800-01. 
182Vacco, 521 U.S. at 808-09. 
183Id. at 809. 
184Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1431. 
185Id. 
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protection analysis.  The analysis of the court, however, is based on a flawed 
application of the rational basis test that would not be followed by the Supreme 
Court. 
The trial court first accurately enunciated the rational basis standard, noting that a 
statute is presumed valid if it “is rationally related to a legitimate State interest.”187  
Moreover, the court acknowledged that the rational basis standard defers to the 
judgment of the legislature by not requiring that the legislators articulate the 
rationale for a classification, nor must the state produce evidence to support the 
rational basis.188  The court then listed the state interests promoted by the DWDA, 
and made no effort to dispute the legitimacy of these interests.189  These interests 
included preventing unnecessary pain and suffering of terminally ill persons, 
preserving the right of competent adults to make critical health care decisions, 
avoiding “tragic cases” of “less humane,” possibly unsuccessful suicides, and 
protecting the terminally ill and their families from financial hardship.190  
Despite having made a case for the DWDA being rationally related to several 
legitimate state interests, the court held that the law failed the rational basis test.191  
In reaching this conclusion, the court was actually balancing the interests of the 
terminally ill against those of the state.192  Such a standard is closer to intermediate 
level scrutiny than rational basis.193  The Lee court reasoned that vulnerable 
terminally ill patients are entitled to the same protections from committing suicide 
that non-terminally ill patients receive.194  Thus, these interests outweighed the 
state’s interests in allowing assisted suicide.  
To apply heightened scrutiny to an equal protection claim a court must find that 
the classification drawn by the statute either “implicates a fundamental liberty 
interest”195 or “targets a suspect class.”196  The distinction between terminally ill and 
non-terminally ill patients is not one of the suspect classifications identified by the 
Supreme Court.197  Moreover, the earlier discussion showed that the Court is unlikely 
to find that a due process challenge to a law permitting PAS implicates a 
fundamental right or liberty interest.  The Court similarly is not likely to find a 
fundamental interest at issue in an equal protection challenge.  The DWDA would 
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194Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1438. 
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therefore also be evaluated for equal protection purposes under a true rational basis 
test, and it would survive this level of review.   
V.  CONCLUSION  
Oregon’s DWDA provides a mechanism to bring the most serious end-of-life 
decisions out into the open.  It should promote honest, in-depth discussion of these 
issues between patient and physician.  In so doing, it should raise the level of end-of- 
life care received by patients.  This process is far superior to the physician providing 
sedating medication with “double intent,” without patient and physician overtly 
having arrived at a decision to hasten the patient’s death. 
The myriad meanings of a patient’s request to end his life must be fully explored 
before medication is prescribed.  Is better palliative care needed?  Would the patient 
change his mind about suicide with counseling, an improved support system, or 
treatment for depression?  Or is the patient’s choice “rational,” and not a by-product 
of a depressive disorder?  While the patient should discuss these issues with her own 
physician, the issues are too complex to be decided without the help of a mental 
health specialist.  A psychiatrist, preferably one expert in end-of-life care, should 
evaluate every patient requesting assisted suicide.  The DWDA should be thus 
amended by the Oregon legislature. 
This is not to say that the DWDA lacks provisions to safeguard the welfare of 
patients.  The requirement of a second opinion consultation prevents an idiosyncratic 
physician from foisting his views on vulnerable patients, and enhances the likelihood 
that the decision will represent a mainstream medical opinion.  The fifteen-day 
waiting period provides the patient with an opportunity to change his mind, and 
consequently deters impulsive behavior.  Counseling by a psychiatrist or 
psychologist, though not required in every case, is mandatory when a question of 
depression is raised.  While not perfect, many aspects of the DWDA are medically 
sound.  
This Article has demonstrated that the DWDA is constitutionally sound as well.   
The Supreme Court probably would find that the law comports with constitutional 
requirements of due process and equal protection.  In keeping with its decisions in 
Glucksberg and Vacco, the Court likely would define the rights asserted by 
challengers to the DWDA narrowly, as non-fundamental liberty interests.  The 
statute would therefore be evaluated under the permissive rational basis 
constitutional standard.  The Court has shown great willingness to allow the states to 
determine their own policies regarding end-of-life decision making through debate 
and legislation.  Thus, the State of Oregon’s determination that the DWDA rationally 
promotes the legitimate governmental interest of preventing unnecessary suffering of 
terminally ill individuals likely would be accepted by the Court. 
Consistent with the philosophies of both Alexander Pope and Yogi Berra, 
upholding the DWDA would acknowledge that while “hope springs eternal,”198 there 
still sometimes comes a time to acknowledge that “it’s over.”199   
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